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Abstract: This paper studies an optimal fiscal policy problem of Lucas and Stokey (1983) but in a situation 
in which the representative agent’s distrust of the probability model for government expenditures puts 
model uncertainty premia into history-contingent prices. This situation gives rise to a motive for 
expectation management that is absent within rational expectations and a novel incentive for the planner 
to smooth the shadow value of the agent’s subjective beliefs to manipulate the equilibrium price of 
government debt. Unlike the Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, the optimal allocation, tax rate, and debt 
become history dependent despite complete markets and Markov government expenditures. 
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Optimal policy design problems heavily exploit the rational expectations assumption that
attributes a unique and fully trusted probability model to all agents. That useful assumption
precludes carrying out a coherent analysis that attributes fears of model misspeci¯cation to
some or all agents.
It seems natural to ask the question: How should we approach policy design problems in
macroeconomics when at least some agents distrust the model? This question is not just of
academic interest but of particular practical relevance. Lack of con¯dence in models seems
to have become pronounced in the recent ¯nancial crisis and has entered policy discussions.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), for example, impute sets of probability models and a
max-min criterion to private agents as a way to model Knightian uncertainty when a lender of
last resort copes with °ights to quality, whereas Uhlig (2009) appeals to uncertainty aversion
to justify pessimism during bank runs. Our approach can be viewed as putting a particular
structure on a decision maker's set of models and thereby on his pessimism. This additional
structure opens up channels of in°uence for policy makers not present in the analyses of
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Uhlig (2009).1
This paper features a notion of expectation management that is absent from the standard
rational expectations paradigm. We formulate an optimal policy problem in which private
agents' fears of model misspeci¯cation cause them to adjust their expectations in ways that
a Ramsey planner recognizes and exploits, bringing the household's endogenous beliefs into
the forefront of an optimal policy design problem because they a®ect equilibrium prices.
We study a Ramsey ¯scal policy problem in which a planner knows that a representative
household distrusts a probability model for exogenous sequences of government expenditures,
while the planner still trusts it. We start with the complete-markets economy without capital
analyzed by Lucas and Stokey (1983), but modify the representative household's preferences
to express his concerns about misspeci¯cation of the stochastic process for government expen-
ditures. The planner can use a distortionary tax on labor income and issue state-contingent
debt in order to ¯nance the exogenous government expenditures. Our household expresses
distrust of his model by ranking consumption plans according to the multiplier preferences
of Hansen and Sargent (2001); when a multiplier parameter assumes a special value, the
expected utility preferences of Lucas and Stokey (1983) emerge as a special case in which
the decision maker completely trusts his probability model.2
1For further policy recommendations based on the insights of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) see
Caballero and Kurlat (2009).
2Multiplier preferences lead to tractable functional forms. See Maccheroni et al. (2006a,b) and Strzalecki
2The Lucas and Stokey (1983) environment isolates essential dimensions of an optimal
macroeconomic policy design problem in which a representative household's ambiguity about
its statistical model creates an avenue that motivates the planner to manipulate the house-
hold's beliefs, because they a®ect equilibrium Arrow-Debreu prices.
More speci¯cally, the Ramsey planner and the household share a common sequence of
transition densities ¼t+1(gt+1jgt) for government spending gt+1 conditional on histories gt
of gs for s from 0 to t. The household's concern about misspeci¯cation leads it to twist


















where Vt+1(gt+1) is a continuation value and µ 2 [µ;+1] is a positive multiplier parameter
expressing the household's distrust of ¼t+1(gt+1jgt). Multiplication by (1) raises probabilities
of events that give rise to lower continuation values and lowers those giving rise to higher
continuation values. The continuation values are themselves constructed recursively in a
way that makes them depend on future distortions m¤
t+j. In a competitive equilibrium,
the household's distorted probabilities ~ ¼t+1(gt+1jgt) = m¤
t+1¼t+1(gt+1jgt) help determine the
prices of date- and history-contingent securities. The Ramsey planner cares about these
prices because he wants to manipulate the value of government debt passed from one period
to the next. The fact that the distortions m¤
t+1 depend on continuation values, which in
turn depend on continuation allocations, means that the planner in°uences the household's
beliefs and equilibrium prices by its choices of state contingent tax and borrowing strategies.
The endogeneity of the household's pessimistic beliefs contributes additional restrictions
on allocations that supplement implementability conditions already present in Lucas and
Stokey's model. The planner's response to these additional implementability conditions
injects a source of history dependence into taxes, government debt, and allocations that is
not present in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
A salient feature of the Ramsey plan of Lucas and Stokey (1983) is the absence of history
dependence in allocations, tax rates, and government debt. For example, with Markov
government expenditures, the value of government debt at date t depends only on the date t
value of the Markov state that drives government expenditures. Lucas and Stokey failed to
rationalize the permanent-income like predictions of Barro (1979) that put extensive history
(2008) for axioms that rationalize multiplier preferences as expressions of model ambiguity.
3dependence into tax rates and government debt. The impression that observed time series of
government debt and taxes have apparently exhibited history dependence { observed series
on government debt are much smoother series than the ones predicted by the Lucas-Stokey
model and more like those in Barro's model { prompted Aiyagari et al. (2002) and Battaglini
and Coate (2008) to put history dependence into a Ramsey plan, in the model of Aiyagari
et al. (2002), or a political-economic bargaining equilibrium, in the model of Battaglini and
Coate (2008), by dropping Lucas and Stokey's assumption of complete markets. In our setup,
we retain the assumption of complete markets, but ¯nd that history dependence emerges
as a consequence of optimal policy, re°ecting the planner's management of the household's
endogenous beliefs. For example, with quasi-linear preferences, dependence on the past can
be quite striking: for small doubts about the model, we show that the tax rate becomes a
random walk, whereas it would stay constant with full con¯dence in the model.
We use tools from the recursive contracts literature and utilize the Marcet and Marimon
(1998) method to ¯nd state variables with which to cast a recursive representation of the
Ramsey problem. Two martingales capture the history dependence of the optimal allocation.
What are the economic insights that emerge in our environment? Our state variables let
us identify a novel intertemporal smoothing motive for the planner in the form of a desire to
smooth the shadow value of the household's continuation value by making it a martingale.
There is a simple intuition behind this ¯nding that underscores the price manipulation that
partly motivates the planner: the planner strives to make consumption claims cheaper when
he buys them and more expensive when he sells them, by manipulating the household's
endogenous beliefs.
To see that clearly, assume that the government expenditures take two values and that
there is a sequence of high shocks. Complete markets allow the planner to hedge shocks by
buying ex ante assets for the case of high shocks and selling ex ante assets (issuing government
debt) for the case of low shocks. In the Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, the planner's
optimal policy depends only on the realization of the shock every period, and therefore
entails a constant tax rate, and a constant government de¯cit every period, corresponding
to the sequence of high shocks. With doubts about the model though, the planner has an
incentive to decrease the tax rate over time and increase the assets that he is buying ex ante.
The reason is that by decreasing the tax rate the planner raises the household's utility and
leads the household to assign a lower probability on these contingencies, as seen from (1),
thereby decreasing the equilibrium price of consumption claims that the government buys.
The opposite would happen in the case of a sequence of low shocks, leading to an increasing
sequence of tax rates in order to increase the equilibrium price (decrease the interest rate)
4of debt that the government issues. Therefore the planner front-loads taxes in the case of
a sequence of high government expenditure shocks and back-loads taxes in the case of a
sequence of low government expenditure shocks in order to a®ect equilibrium prices through
beliefs.
This illustrates the expectation management aspect of optimal policy. An important
feature of our optimal policy problem that needs to be stressed is the fact that expectation
management is not activated by a di®erence of beliefs between the planner and household.
Clearly though, the heterogeneity in beliefs consists an additional force that shapes our
results. A planner that does not doubt the model has an incentive to tax more when there
are high ¯scal shocks because he considers them less probable than the pessimistic household
and less when there are low ¯scal shocks since he considers more probable than the household,
leading to a behavior that acts in the opposite direction than his price manipulation e®orts.
1.1 Related literature
Other contributions that share our aim of attributing misspeci¯cation fears to at least some
agents include Kocherlakota and Phelan (2008), who study a mechanism design problem
using a max-min expected utility criterion and Hansen and Sargent (2007, ch. 16), who
formulate a model in which a Stackelberg leader distrusts an approximating model while
a competitive fringe of followers completely trusts it.3 Hansen and Sargent's assumptions
about the leader's and followers' speci¯cation concerns in e®ect reverse the ones made here.
In several ways, Woodford (2008) is the most interesting previous paper for us because he
also uses a general equilibrium model and because of how the timing is set up to conceal
the private sector's beliefs from the government. In Woodford's model, while both the
government and the private sectors fully trust their own models, the government distrusts
its knowledge of the private sector's beliefs about prices. Arranging things so that this is
possible is subtle because with enough markets, equilibrium prices and allocations reveal
private sector beliefs. In contrast to Woodford, we set things up with complete markets
whose prices fully reveal private sector beliefs to the Ramsey planner.
Any analysis with multiple subjective probability models requires a convenient way to
express those models. Along with Woodford (2008), this paper uses the martingale repre-
sentation of Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2006) and Hansen et al. (2006). From the point
of view of the approximating model, these martingale perturbations look like multiplicative
3Our work is also linked in a general sense to that of Brunnermeier et al. (2007), who study a setting in
which households choose their beliefs.
5preference shocks. In the present context, the Ramsey planner manipulates those `shocks'.
This paper resides at the intersection of three strands of literature. Optimal policy
analysis by Bassetto (1999), Chari et al. (1994), Zhu (1992), Angeletos (2002) and Buera
and Nicolini (2004) in complete markets, or in incomplete markets by Aiyagari et al. (2002),
Shin (2006) and Marcet and Scott (2009), and recursive representations as in Chang (1998)
and Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) are all relevant antecedents of work. The multiplier preferences
we are using are closely related to risk-sensitive preferences and to Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Weil (1990) preferences and therefore our work is also related to Anderson (2005) and
Tallarini (2000), who study the impact of risk-sensitivity on risk-sharing and on business
cycles respectively, as well as to Hansen et al. (1999), who study the e®ect of doubts about
the model on permanent income theory and asset prices. Another related line of work is
Farhi and Werning (2008), who analyze the implications of recursive preferences in private
information setups.
2 The economy
To create an avenue for the planner to manipulate beliefs, we modify the preferences of
the representative consumer but not the planner in the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
Time t ¸ 0 is discrete and the horizon in¯nite. Labor is the only input into a linear
technology that produces one perishable good that can be allocated to private consumption
ct or government consumption gt. Markets are complete and competitive. The only source of
uncertainty is an exogenous sequence of government expenditures gt that potentially takes on
a ¯nite or countable number of values. Let gt = (g0;:::;gt) denote the history of government
expenditures. Equilibrium plans for work and consumption have date t components that are
measurable functions of gt. A representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, works
ht(gt), enjoys leisure lt(gt) = 1¡ht(gt) and consumes ct(gt) at history gt for each t ¸ 0. One
unit of labor can be transformed into one unit of the good. Feasible allocations satisfy
ct(g
t) + gt = ht(g
t): (2)
Competition makes the real wage wt(gt) = 1 for all t ¸ 0 and any history gt. The government
¯nances its time t expenditures either by using a linear tax ¿t(gt) on labor income or by issuing
a vector of state-contingent debt bt+1(gt+1;gt) that is sold at price pt(gt+1;gt) at history gt
and promises to pay one unit of the consumption good if government expenditures are gt+1
6next period and zero otherwise. The one-period government budget constraint at t is
bt(g








Equivalently, we can work with an Arrow-Debreu formulation in which all trades occur
at date 0 at Arrow-Debreu history- and date-contingent prices qt(gt). In this setting, the
















2.1 Fear of model misspeci¯cation
The representative agent and the government share an approximating model in the form of
a sequence of joint densities ¼t(gt) over histories gt 8t · 1. Following Hansen and Sargent
(2005), we characterize model misspeci¯cations with multiplicative perturbations that are
martingales with respect to the approximating model. The representative agent, but not the
government, fears that the approximating model is misspeci¯ed in the sense that the history
of government expenditures will actually be drawn from a joint density that di®ers from the
approximating model but is absolutely continuous with respect to the approximating model
over ¯nite time intervals. Thus, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem there exists a non-negative
random variable Mt with E(Mt) = 1 that is a measurable function of the history gt and that
has the interpretation of a change of measure. The random variable Mt, which we take to
be a likelihood ratio Mt(gt) =
~ ¼t(gt)
¼t(gt) of a distorted density ~ ¼t to the approximating density
¼t is a martingale, i.e., EtMt+1 = Mt where E denotes expectation with respect to the
approximating model. Here the tilde refers to a distorted model. Evidently, we can compute
the mathematical expectation of a random variable Xt(gt) under a distorted measure as
~ E(Xt) = E(MtXt):




for Mt > 0
and let mt+1 ´ 1 when Mt = 0, (i.e., when the distorted model assigns zero probability to a
7particular history). Then





The non-negative random variable mt+1 distorts the conditional probability of gt+1 given
history gt, so that it is a conditional likelihood ratio mt+1 =
~ ¼t+1(gt+1jgt)
¼t+1(gt+1jgt). It has to satisfy the
restriction that Etmt+1 = 1 in order qualify as a distortion to the conditional measure. We
measure discrepancies between conditional distributions by relative entropy, which is de¯ned
as
"t(mt+1) = E(mt+1 logmt+1jg
t):
Note that relative entropy is zero if the approximating and perturbed models coincide and
positive otherwise. Relative entropy is the expected log-likelihood ratio under the perturbed
model.
2.2 Preferences
To represent fear of model misspeci¯cation, we use the multiplier preferences of Hansen and
Sargent (2001) and Hansen et al. (2006) to describe how the representative consumer ranks

































where ´ measures the size of an entropy ball of models surrounding the approximating model. This constraint
could be used to formulate the constraint preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001). They discuss the
relation between constraint preferences and the multiplier preferences featured in this paper and show how
to construct ´ ex post as a function of the multiplier µ in (5) and other parameters.
8where U(ct;1 ¡ ht) is the same period utility function assumed by Lucas and Stokey (1983)
and the multiplier µ > 0 is a penalty parameter that measures fear of model misspeci¯cation.5
Higher values of the multiplier parameter µ represent more con¯dence in the approximating
model ¼t. Full con¯dence is captured by µ = 1, which reduces the above preferences
to the expected utility preferences of the Lucas and Stokey household. Along with Lucas
and Stokey, we assume that U(c;1 ¡ h) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and thrice
continuously di®erentiable.6
2.3 The representative household's problem

























































Inequality (6) is the intertemporal budget constraint of the household. The right side is
the discounted present value of after tax labor income plus an initial asset position b0 that
can assume positive (denoting government debt) or negative (denoting government assets)
values.
5The multiplier preferences can be written recursively as
Vt = U(ct;1 ¡ ht) + ¯ min
mt+1
fEtmt+1Vt+1 + µ"t(mt+1)g:
6Strict concavity is not satis¯ed for the quasi-linear example to be studied in subsection 6.1.
7We assume that uncertainty at t = 0 has been realized, so ¼0(g0) = 1. Thus, the distortion of the
probability of the initial period is normalized to be unity, so that M0 ´ 1.
92.4 The inner problem: choosing beliefs
The inner problem chooses (M;m) to minimize the utility of the representative household
subject to the law of motion of the martingale M and the restriction that the conditional


















´;all t ¸ 0;g
t (10)
where the asterisks denote optimal values and Vt is the utility of the household under the
distorted measure, which follows the recursion







Equations (10) and (11) are the ¯rst-order conditions for the minimization problem with
respect to mt+1 and Mt. Substituting (10) into (11) gives


















t ; M0 ´ 1: (13)
Equation (13) asserts that the martingale distortion attaches higher probabilities to histo-
ries with low continuation utilities and lower probabilities to histories with high continuation
utilities. Such exponential tilting of probabilities summarizes how the representative house-
hold's distrust of the approximating model produces conservative probability assessments
that give rise to an indirect utility function that solves the recursion (12), an example of the
discounted risk-sensitive preferences of Hansen and Sargent (1995).8 For µ = 1 (or equiv-
alently ¾ = 0) the conditional and unconditional distortion become unity M¤
t = m¤
t = 1,
expressing the lack of doubts about the approximating model.
8The risk-sensitive recursion is closely related to the preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990).
102.5 Outer problem: choosing fct;htg plan




= 1 ¡ ¿t(g
t) (14)












Here we have normalized the price of an Arrow-Debreu security at t = 0 to unity, so q0(g0) ´
















Remark 1. Doubts about the model show up as a worst-case conditional density in the deter-
mination of the equilibrium price of an Arrow security. The stochastic discount factor under
the approximating model has an additional multiplicative element which depends on contin-
uation utility, an endogenous forward-looking object. The presence of continuation utilities
creates a channel by which a Ramsey planner in°uences equilibrium prices, augmenting the
marginal utilities channel that is already present in Lucas and Stokey.
De¯nition. A competitive equilibrium is a consumption-labor allocation (c;h), distortions
to beliefs (m;M); a price system q, and a government policy (g;¿) such that (a) given
(q;¿);(c;h) and (m;M) solve the household's problem, and (b) markets clear, so that ct(gt)+
gt = ht(gt)8t;gt.
3 Ramsey Problem
A Ramsey planner chooses at t = 0 state-contingent debt and distortionary taxes on labor
income at every history. While the representative household distrusts the approximating
model ¼, the Ramsey planner completely trusts it. Therefore, the Ramsey planner chooses a
competitive equilibrium allocation that maximizes the expected utility of the representative
11household under the approximating model.9
We use the primal approach employed by Lucas and Stokey (1983). The Ramsey planner
chooses allocations subject to the resource constraint (2) and implementability constraints
imposed by competitive equilibrium.
























t) + Uc(g0)b0; (17)
the law of motion for the martingale that represents distortions to beliefs (13), and the
recursion for the representative household's value function (12).
Proof. Besides the resource constraint, a competitive equilibrium is characterized fully by
the household's two Euler equations, the intertemporal budget constraint (6) that holds with
equality at an optimum, and equations (13) and (12), which describe the evolution of the
endogenous beliefs of the agent. Use (14) and (15) to substitute for prices and after tax
wages in the intertemporal budget constraint to obtain (17).





























t)] = Uc(g0)b0 (18)
ct(g
































t;t ¸ 1 (21)
9In Karantounias et al. (2007), we study alternative sets of assumptions that allow the Ramsey planner to
doubt the approximating model and also possibly instruct the planner to evaluate expected utilities using the
representative household's beliefs. The current setup isolates key forces that also operate in that alternative
setting.
12Remark 2. The presence of the distorted beliefs in (17) contributes two additional imple-
mentability constraints to those already in Lucas and Stokey (1983). The Ramsey planner
takes into account how the allocation (c;h) a®ects the utility of the agent Vt(gt), which deter-
mines in turn the endogenous likelihood ratio M¤
t (gt) and the consequent worst-case beliefs.
Note that we could interpret the minimization problem of the household in the description
of the preferences in (5) as the problem of a malevolent alter ego who, by choosing a worst-
case probability distortion, motivates the household to value robust decision rules. Along the
lines of this interpretation, the Ramsey problem becomes a Stackelberg game with one leader
and two followers, namely, the representative household and the representative household's
malevolent alter ego.
3.1 First-best benchmark (i.e., lump-sum taxes available)
By ¯rst-best, we mean the allocation that maximizes the expected utility of the household
under ¼ subject to the resource constraint (2). Note that for any beliefs of the planner, the
¯rst-best is characterized by the condition
Ul(gt)
Uc(gt) = 1 and the resource constraint (2), so the
¯rst-best allocation (^ c;^ h) is independent of probabilities ¼. Private sector beliefs a®ect asset
prices through (15), but not the allocation. Because lump-sum taxes are not available in our
model, the planner's and the household's beliefs both a®ect allocations.
3.2 Optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem
De¯ne for convenience ­(ct(gt);ht(gt)) ´ Uc(gt)ct(gt)¡Ul(gt)ht(gt) 10 and attach multipliers
©, ¯t¼t(gt)¸t(gt), ¯t+1¼t+1(gt+1)¹t+1(gt+1), and ¯t¼t(gt)»t(gt) to constraints (17), (2), (13),
and (12), respectively.
First-order necessary conditions11 for an interior solution are
10Note that ­t represents the equilibrium government surplus or de¯cit in marginal utility terms, ­t =
Uct[¿tht ¡ gt].
11We set up the Lagrangian and derive the ¯rst-order condition with respect to Vt(gt) in a separate
appendix available upon request.







t);t ¸ 1 (22)













































t¡1);t ¸ 1 (25)
c0 : (1 + »0)Uc(g0) + ©M0­c(g0) = ¸0(g0) + ©Ucc(g0)b0 (26)
h0 : ¡(1 + »0)Ul(g0) + ©M0­h(g0) = ¡¸0(g0) ¡ ©Ucl(g0)b0: (27)
In (24) and (25), we used expression (10) for the optimal conditional likelihood ratio
m¤
t+1 to save notation.
Remark 3. In formulating the Ramsey problem, the last constraint (12) applies only from
period one on since the value of the agent at t = 0 V0 is not relevant to the problem due to
the normalization M0 ´ 1. We can set the initial value of the multiplier equal to zero »0 = 0
to accommodate this. Equivalently, we could maximize with respect to V0 to get an additional
¯rst-order condition »0 = 0.
Remark 4. Since »0 = 0;M0 = 1, the ¯rst-order conditions (26, 27) for the initial consumption-
labor allocation (c0;h0) are the same as the respective ¯rst-order conditions for the special
Lucas and Stokey (1983) case where the representative consumer fears no misspeci¯cation.
The ¯rst-order conditions (22-27) together with the constraints (18-21) determine the
Ramsey plan.
144 Characterizing the Ramsey plan










the ¯rst term on the left is the marginal utility the Ramsey planner gets by increasing
consumption by one unit. The second term on the left measures how increasing consumption
a®ects the representative household's value function and consequently its worst-case model
perturbation M¤
t+1. As we shall see later, the multiplier »t serves as a state variable in a
recursive statement of the Ramsey problem. Note that if the Ramsey planner were not to
take into account that the worst-case beliefs of the representative household are endogenous,
this term would be zero. The third term on the left represents the typical constraints that a
competitive equilibrium allocation imposes on the Ramsey planner through the value of the
government surplus and describes how the government surplus (in marginal utility terms)
is a®ected when consumption is increased. Note though that there is a twist due to the
presence of the likelihood ratio M¤
t , stemming from the fact that equilibrium prices re°ect
the representative household's worst-case beliefs ~ ¼t, which di®er from the planner's beliefs
¼t. Had the planner and the household shared the same beliefs, M¤
t would not show up in
(22). The right side is the shadow value of output. Analogous interpretations apply to the
¯rst-order condition (23) for ht.
4.1 Optimal wedge
Substituting the derivatives of ­ with respect to c and h into ¯rst-order conditions (22) and





















This condition describes the optimal wedge (Ul ¡ Uc) that determines the optimal tax
15rate for t ¸ 1. 12
Proposition 2. The Ramsey allocation and taxes from period one onward are history de-
pendent.
Proof. Use the resource constraint (2) to substitute for ht in (28) and solve for optimal
consumption terms in terms of (gt;M¤
t ;»t) and the multiplier © to get ct = c(gt;M¤
t ;»t;©).
Analogously, we get ht = h(gt;M¤
t ;»t;©) and consequently from (14) the optimal tax rate
¿t = ¿(gt;M¤
t ;»t;©). Therefore, the allocation and taxes at t depends on the history of
shocks as intermediated through M¤
t and »t.
Relative to the outcome in Lucas and Stokey (1983), the representative household's fear of
misspeci¯cation makes the Ramsey allocation depend on two additional variables, namely,
the likelihood ratio M¤
t and the multiplier »t on the forward-looking constraint (12) that
describes the evolution of the household's value function Vt. The multiplier »t measures
the shadow value to the planner of the representative household's value. It shows up in
the optimal wedge (28) because increasing ct;ht a®ects Vt and therefore the household's
worst-case distorted measure. The likelihood ratio M¤
t in°uences the Arrow-Debreu prices
that become embedded in the implementability constraint (17) and shows up in the optimal
wedge due to the fact that the planner does not doubt the model. These two variables
are absent from Lucas and Stokey (1983), since for ¾ = 0 and from (10),(13) and (25), we
see that »t(gt) = 0;M¤
t (gt) = 1;8t;gt. In this special case, equation (28) that determines
the optimal wedge instructs us that only the current realization of the government shock gt
determines the optimal allocation and taxes cLS
t (gt) = c(gt;©). The only intertemporal link
in this case occurs implicitly through the value of the multiplier © on the implementability
constraint, and this by itself imparts no history dependence. Therefore, we have the well-
known result that the Lucas and Stokey (1983) plan inherits the stochastic properties of
government expenditures.
Discussion In the Lucas and Stokey case, the time-additive expected utility assumption
and the completeness of the markets allows the government to ignore the past and pay
attention only to the current shock in its e®orts to smooth tax distortions. With doubts
12The optimal wedge at the initial period is




Ucc(g0)(c0 ¡ b0) ¡ Ucl(g0)(c0 ¡ b0 + h0) + Ull(g0)h0
¤
:
In the absence of initial debt b0 = 0, the optimal wedge at t = 0 would be determined by (28) for (M0;»0) =
(1;0). Initial consumption is a function of (g0,b0) and ©, c0 = c(g0;b0;©).
16about the model, even though there is a unique intertemporal budget constraint due to the
complete markets assumption, history dependence emerges because intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution (and therefore equilibrium prices) are interconnected across histories
through continuation utilities.
4.2 Tax rate
We can express the optimal tax in terms of the allocation and (M¤;») as follows. Dividing
(28) by ¡Uc(gt) and using ¿t = 1 ¡
Ul





















where °RA(gt) ´ ¡Uccc=Uc, the coe±cient of relative risk aversion.13
Remark 5. Formula (29) shows that the planner chooses smaller tax wedges at histories
that the representative household thinks are less probable than does the Ramsey planner, i.e.,
when M¤
t (gt) is small. The planner chooses low tax rates for high values of the multiplier »t.
4.3 State variables
The problem under commitment has history dependence that adds state variables to the
exogenous state variable gt. Proposition 2 suggests that the endogenous variables M¤
t and »t
are natural candidates for state variables in a recursive formulation of the Ramsey problem,
which we pursue along the lines of Marcet and Marimon (1998). 14
Proposition 3. Let the approximating model of government expenditures be Markov. Then
the Ramsey problem from period one onward can be represented recursively by keeping as a
state variable the vector (gt;M¤
t ;»t). The likelihood ratio M¤
t and the multiplier »t follow
13It is easy to show that the tax rate is positive when Ucl ¸ 0. According to (29), this amounts to showing
that expression 1+»t+©M¤
t is positive, despite the fact that »t can take negative values. Calculating ­c in the
¯rst-order condition (22) and rearranging delivers expression Uct(1+»t+©M¤
t ) = ¸t¡©M¤
t (Ucc;tct¡Ucl;tht) >
0, since the shadow value of output ¸t is positive and Ucl ¸ 0.
14The Bellman equation that describes the planner's problem is constructed in a separate appendix avail-
able upon request.










with initial values (M0;»0) = (1;0). The policy functions for consumption, household utility










Discussion The logic of the Marcet and Marimon (1998) method (and in fact of any
method that tries to represent commitment problems recursively) is to augment the state
space appropriately in order to capture the restrictions that the planner has to respect every
period. The multiplier »t (the co-state variable) on the forward-looking implementability
constraint (21) becomes a state variable, with initial value zero, which re°ects the fact that
the planner at period one is not constrained to commit to the shadow value of his utility
promises to the household. The nature of our problem also requires the inclusion in the
state of the likelihood ratio M¤
t with law of motion (13). This augmented state allows us to
express the policy problem as a functional saddle point problem.
4.4 Interpretation of ¹t
Fear of misspeci¯cation alters the essentially static nature of the Lucas and Stokey problem
by injecting the probability distortion and the multiplier (M¤
t ;»t). In order to understand
how the planner tries to a®ect equilibrium prices though the channel of beliefs, it helps to
interpret the ¯rst-order conditions with respect to (M¤
t ;Vt).
Consider ¹t, the multiplier on the evolution equation for the likelihood ratio (13), which
represents the shadow value to the planner of distorting the probability of history gt. Using
15In the case of an i.i.d. approximating model we would have M¤
t = M¤(gt;M¤
t¡1;»t¡1;©) and »t =
»(gt;M¤
t¡1;»t¡1;©).
16Note that, as our notation suggests, the policy functions are contingent on a value of the multiplier ©.
After ¯nding the policy functions for ct = c(gt;M¤
t ;»t;©);t ¸ 1 and c0(g0;b0;©), the multiplier © is adjusted
so that the intertemporal budget constraint is satis¯ed.
















t (gt) to make history gt more probable has two e®ects: ¯rst, it a®ects prices at
history gt which is measured by the ¯rst term on the right, which is the marginal utility of a
government surplus ­t multiplied by the shadow value of distortionary taxation ©. Second,
it alters the unconditional probability of next period's history, which is re°ected by the
second term on the right.
Let qt


































t+i) ¡ gt+i]: (30)





The government's budget constraint implies that the asset position of the government
bt(gt) equals the present discounted value of all future government surpluses, which renders
bt(gt) the relevant variable for capturing all intertemporal e®ects of changing the equilibrium
price of an Arrow-Debreu security qt(gt) by means of the likelihood ratio M¤
t .
4.5 Dynamics of »t
Consider now the ¯rst-order condition with respect to Vt(gt), which delivers the law of motion









t»t¡1;t ¸ 1;»0 = 0 (32)
19where E denotes mathematical expectation under the approximating model. The planner
faces intricate dynamic tradeo®s. By increasing Vt(gt), he a®ects the household's expectation
at t ¡ 1 for the current period t. However, the planner is constrained to con¯rm the value
Vt(gt) that he had earlier promised the household according to the promise-keeping constraint
(21). The shadow value to the planner of the promised utility to the household is captured
by the multiplier »t¡1, the second term on the right side of (32). The planner is able to steer
the household's worst-case beliefs via equation (20) by committing to respect the recursion
of the household's utility (21).
Furthermore, increasing Vt(gt) a®ects household beliefs for the current period by decreas-
ing the probability of the history gt and all subsequent future histories emanating from gt,
an e®ect measured by the multiplier ¹t in the ¯rst term of the right side. But decreasing
by means of Vt the probability of this particular node of the event tree implies increasing
probabilities attached to the other nodes, so that probabilities add to unity, as can be seen
clearly from equation (10). The total e®ect is measured by ´t ´ ¹t ¡ Et¡1m¤
t¹t, i.e., the in-
novation in ¹t under the distorted measure ~ ¼, or in other words, the one-step ahead forecast
error of ¹t with conditional mean under the distorted measure Et¡1m¤
t´t equal to zero by
construction. This is the ¯rst term of the right-hand side. Optimality requires that the sum
of the two e®ects must equal the shadow value of the promised utility of next period »t, the
left side of equation (32). Besides that, »t has the following property:
Lemma 1. The multiplier »t is a martingale under the approximating model.
Proof. Taking conditional expectation with respect to the approximating model ¼ given
history gt¡1 in the law of motion (32) for » and remembering that variables dated at t are
























Remark 6. Since the two state variables (M¤
t ;»t) are martingales with respect to the ap-
proximating model, any transitory shock in government expenditures will have a permanent
e®ect on the state variables that are driving the Ramsey plan.
An immediate corollary of lemma 1 is that the mean value of the »t is zero since E(»t) =
20E(E0»t) = E(»0) = 0. Note also that »t can take both positive and negative values because
constraint (12) can bind in both directions.
5 Manipulation of expectations and prices
In this section we show that the state variables depict two distinct forces that are shaping
the Ramsey plan: price manipulation of government debt through the management of the
household's expectations (»t) and the belief heterogeneity between planner and household
(M¤
t ).
5.1 Incentives to manipulate continuation utilities and beliefs
The household's doubts about the model make continuation utilities among the determinants
of equilibrium prices. This contributes a multiplier »t that in°uences the Ramsey plan.17 We
will use as a guide the evolution of »t (32) in order to interpret how the planner manipulates
equilibrium prices via continuation utilities and to describe implications for the tax rate.
There are two dimensions along which the household's doubts about the model alter the
Ramsey plan, an intratemporal one (among realizations of government expenditures shocks
for a given t) and an intertemporal one. We explore the intratemporal dimension ¯rst by
focusing on ¹t.
The multiplier ¹t is the shadow value for the planner of the likelihood ratio M¤
t and
captures the marginal bene¯t or cost of increasing the equilibrium price via the worst-case
beliefs of the household. It is easy to see how the likelihood ratio M¤
t is associated with the
government bond holdings from the equilibrium intertemporal budget constraint
Uc0b0 = ­0 + ¯E0m
¤











which makes transparent the fact that ¹t is associated with the debt obligations of the
government ¹t = ©Uctbt, as we have shown before. Note that the multiplier ¹t would be zero
if the marginal cost of distortionary taxation © were zero. This re°ects the fact that in a ¯rst-
best world where lump-sum taxes are available, the equilibrium price of state-contingent debt
is not relevant for the planner's problem. 18 The multiplier ¹t takes positive or negative
17Remember that with full con¯dence in the model we have »t = 0, which re°ects the absence of a role for
continuation utilities in equilibrium prices.
18© could also be zero if there were su±ciently large initial assets b0 ¿ 0, a case that would render the
21values depending on the asset position of the government. More speci¯cally, the planner
wants to increase the likelihood ratio and therefore the equilibrium price of consumption
claims at contingencies where the government has outstanding debt obligations (bt > 0) and
wants to decrease it when the public is a net debtor to the government (bt < 0).
The way to interpret the planner's incentives is as follows. Positive government debt at
a particular contingency means that the government is ex-ante selling consumption claims.
Thus, the planner strives to make claims to consumption more expensive through the chan-
nel of worst-case beliefs when he is engaged in selling them. In the opposite situation of
government assets, the planner is ex-ante buying consumption claims, with the resulting
incentive of decreasing the price of claims by decreasing M¤
t .
Of course, the planner is a®ecting the likelihood ratio M¤
t by means of continuation
utility, which by (10) will a®ect also the rest of the conditional likelihood ratios at time t, so
that they integrate to unity. Therefore, the relevant object which properly takes into account
the total e®ect of changing continuation utility is actually the innovation in ¹t under the
household's worst-case beliefs, which we de¯ned in the previous section as ´t ´ ¹t¡Et¡1m¤
t¹t.
So the innovation ´t captures the intratemporal dimension of the price manipulation e®ect
by determining the increment to the martingale »t according to the law of motion (32) and
is associated by (31) with the government asset position as ´t = ©[Uctbt ¡ Et¡1m¤
tUctbt]. A
convenient way to think about ´t and the total e®ect is by de¯ning !t¡1 ´ Et¡1m¤
tUctbt, an
object that can be thought of as the market value at t ¡ 1 of the government portfolio of
state-contingent debt at time t, and by noting that ´t = ©(Uctbt ¡ !t¡1). 19 So the planner
increases the price by lowering continuation utilities at those contingencies upon which he
sells consumption claims above the market value of the government portfolio and decreases
the price in the opposite case. 20
Tax rate implications Furthermore, price manipulation through continuation utilities as
encoded in »t has a direct impact on the Ramsey plan's consumption and leisure allocation
and therefore on the tax rate through (29). A positive innovation ´t > 0 leads to lower »t
and therefore - keeping everything else equal - higher tax rates. Thus, when the planner
wants to sell claims, he tries to increase equilibrium prices by lowering continuation utilities
optimal taxation problem trivial.




20The market value of the government portfolio !t¡1 and the innovation ´t are not just convenient devices
but very closely related to each other: ´t has a direct interpretation as the marginal change in the value of the
government portfolio induced by a change in continuation utility since
@!t¡1
@Vt = ¾¼tjt¡1m¤
t(Uctbt ¡ !t¡1) =
¾¼tjt¡1m¤
t©¡1´t.
22and increasing the tax rate, whereas when he wants to buy claims (´t < 0), he increases
continuation utilities and lowers tax rates.
Our discussion above is in terms of marginal incentives, since we focus on ¯rst-order
conditions and multipliers. Along with the marginal bene¯ts of price manipulation through
continuation utilities, the planner has obviously to take into account the e®ects of changing
the marginal utility of consumption and leisure Uc and Ul, together with his ¯nancing needs
as captured by the multiplier ©.
The preceding description of the incentives confronting the planner is evidently static. On
the intertemporal dimension, note that continuation utilities are forwarding-looking objects
and that any change in Vt(gt) will a®ect all past continuation utilities fV1(g1);:::;Vt¡1(gt¡1)g
along the history gt through recursion (12), and as a result all the past worst-case beliefs of
the household and associated equilibrium prices. Therefore a change in Vt besides altering
the market value of the government portfolio at the end of period t ¡ 1, !t¡1, a®ects also
all past market values of the government portfolios !i;i < t ¡ 1. Consequently, the past
innovations in government debt (in marginal utility terms) ´i;i · t will matter since they
measure the shadow value for the planner of altering the respective equilibrium prices along
history gt through the channel of utility Vt. This can be easily seen by iterating backward
the law of motion of the multiplier »t (32)
»t = ¾M
¤




where Ht is the cumulative forecast error Ht ´
Pt
i=1 ´i;H0 ´ 0. The cumulative forecast
error captures the essence of commitment: the planner must take into account how a gt-
contingent action chosen at t = 0 a®ects the choices of the household along the history gt.
Thus the history of the shocks as summarized by the state variable »t matters because it
tracks dates in the past that the government was lending or borrowing on average, indicating
a corresponding incentive to reduce or increase the equilibrium price of consumption claims
and a respective utility promise.
Smoothing That the planner makes the shadow value of continuation utilities »t a mar-
tingale with respect to his beliefs re°ects a deeper smoothing motive that makes the planner
want to keep the shadow value of continuation utilities constant over time. There is a useful
analogy: With full con¯dence in the probability model, the standard prescription in the
23optimal taxation literature is to \smooth" marginal utilities of consumption and leisure. On
the other hand, when the household has doubts about the model, there is an intertemporal
dimension coming from continuation utilities and their e®ects on equilibrium prices and the
optimal prescription is to smooth the shadow value of the additional channel of continuation
utilities. Note that the additional channel of continuation utilities is bringing back into the
picture the debt dynamics through the martingale »t, a feature absent in the full-con¯dence
complete-markets economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
5.2 Heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes and impact on tax rate
The likelihood ratio M¤
t of the worst-case beliefs of the household over the beliefs of the
planner also in°uences the optimal wedge (28) and therefore the optimal tax rate in (29)
and functions as a state variable which re°ects the heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes
between the household and the planner. From (29), the planner has an incentive to tax
more heavily histories with a high likelihood ratio M¤
t , i.e., histories that the household
considers more probable than the planner, keeping everything else equal. The source of this
incentive is that the representative household and the planner disagree about the evaluation
of welfare losses stemming from a tax ¿t(gt) at history gt because they evaluate the likelihood
of this contingency in a di®erent way. 21 The welfare loss of a given tax at a contingency that
the household considers more probable than the planner is higher for the household than
for the planner. In this case, the planner has an incentive to increase the tax rate, since
the resulting loss coming from this action is not regarded as being so high by the planner.
In opposite cases, i.e. in contingencies that the planner considers more probable than the
household (low M¤
t ), the planner tries to tax less, since high taxes carry high loss in the
planner's evaluation of utility. For example, in the extreme case where M¤
t approaches zero,
the tax rate approaches zero according to (29).
6 The e®ects of small doubts about the model
We can illustrate sharply the impacts of ambiguity aversion on the Ramsey plan by ex-
ploiting the fact that Lucas and Stokey 's plan can be easily calculated due to the history
independence property. This feature allows us to use a perturbation method that expands in
¾ ´ ¡µ¡1 around ¾ = 0, i.e. around the entire stochastic path associated with the Ramsey
21This is exactly the reason why the likelihood ratio shows up in the ¯rst-order conditions (22),(23) and
therefore in the optimal wedge (28).
24plan of Lucas and Stokey, and tells us how introducing a small fear of misspeci¯cation per-
turbs the particular plan.22 To make things concrete, the ¯rst-order approximation around





where zt(gt;0) = z(gt;0) is the history-independent plan of Lucas and Stokey (1983). For
the rest we will use the notational convention zt(¾) ´ zt(gt;¾) and z0
t(¾) ´ z¾(gt;¾).23
As discussed in detail in previous sections the optimal plan is in°uenced by the two state
variables (M¤
t ;»t). In the approximated solution this in°uence occurs through the respective
partial derivatives (M¤0
t (0);»0
t(0)). Observe that for any fear of misspeci¯cation (¾ · 0),
the martingale property of M¤
t (¾) and »t(¾) is bequeathed to the martingale derivatives,
Et¡1M¤0
t (¾) = M¤0
t¡1(¾) and Et¡1»0
t(¾) = »0
t¡1(¾). In particular, the laws of motion of the
martingale derivatives for ¾ = 0 are
Result 1. (Laws of motion of martingale derivatives)
M
¤0
t (0) = m
¤0




0 ´ 0 (35)
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Two remarks about the increments to the martingales are in order. First, note that expo-
nential tilting in (10) is re°ected in the innovation in the household's utility in the Lucas and
Stokey economy. Doubts about the model make the household assign a higher conditional
probability to the realization of an expenditure shock next period that is associated with a
negative innovation in the household's utility, since m¤





ond, we are going to focus on the bond portfolio of the Lucas and Stokey economy, because
it determines the increment to the martingale derivative »0
t(0).
22There are examples of similar in spirit expansions in asset pricing and portfolio choice theory by Hansen
et al. (2007) and Kogan and Uppal (2002).
23The details of the derivations are in a separate appendix available upon request.
256.1 Quasi-linear utility
We proceed with a quasi-linear example. Linearity in consumption eliminates the e®ects
of marginal utility on labor supply and on equilibrium prices. Let the period utility of the
agent take the form
U(c;l) = c + v(1 ¡ l)
Quasi-linear utility leads to Arrow-Debreu prices qt = ¯t¼tM¤
t . Thus, with this preference
speci¯cation, the planner cannot manipulate the marginal utility to allocate distortions over
histories. But he can still manipulate the endogenous beliefs of the agent through the channel
of continuation utilities. For the rest of this section, we assume that v(1¡l) = v(h) = ¡1
2h2,
a speci¯cation which together with (28) delivers the following labor allocation and tax rate:
ht =
1 + »t + ©M¤
t
1 + »t + 2©M¤
t
and ¿t = 1 ¡ ht =
©M¤
t
1 + »t + 2©M¤
t
:
Equations (18-21), together with (24) and (25) determine the dynamics of (»t;M¤
t ) and the
size of ©.
6.1.1 No fear of misspeci¯cation case (¾ = 0)
The optimal plan prescribes constant taxes and labor over time and across states. The lack
of dependence of taxes and labor on the realization of gt is a special feature of quasi-linear
utility that will make more transparent the e®ects of the representative household's fear of
misspeci¯cation. In particular,
ht(0) ´ h =
1 + ©(0)
1 + 2©(0)
¿ = 1 ¡ h









where ©(0) represents the value of the multiplier for the Lucas and Stokey economy, where
agents fully trust their model. 24 Having obtained the Ramsey plan for ¾ = 0, we can
24Since ©(0) > 0, we have hLS 2 (1=2;1]. Labor (and therefore ©(0)) can be pinned down from the
intertemporal budget constraint, which leads to ¯nding the root of equation Q(h) ´ h2 ¡ h + G, where
G ´ (1 ¡ ¯)[b0 + E0
P1
t=0 ¯tgt]. Assume that G is smaller than 1=4, so that a solution exists, and larger
than 0 in order to rule out an initial surplus that can ¯nance the present value of government expenditures,
26proceed to the expansion.
6.1.2 Ramsey allocation for small robustness
The quasi-linearity allows us to derive simple formulas for our expansion. In particular, the
increments to the martingale derivatives are
m
¤0










Equations (37) and (38) show that the dynamics are determined by the innovation in the
present value of government expenditures. 25
To attain more concrete results, assume a Wold moving average representation for the
approximating model of government expenditures
gt = ¹g + °(L)"t (39)
where "t » iid(0;¾2
") and °(¯) > 0. 26





igt+i] = °(¯)"t (40)
where °(¯) is the present value of the coe±cients in the in¯nite order moving average rep-
resentation, which allows us to get convenient approximate formulas for the pessimistic
conditional distribution of "t.
Result 2. The distortion to the conditional distribution of "t is approximately equal to
m
¤









25The innovation to the present value of the income of a representative consumer who fears misspeci¯cation
plays an important role in determining market prices of risk. For example, see Barillas et al. (2007).
26Note that here we drop the restriction that g lives on a countable space. We also assume that " has a
bounded support, so that government expenditures remain positive.
27The worst-case mean and variance of "t are approximately equal to
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Result (2) implies that the household assigns higher probability on the event of a pos-
itive innovation in the present value of government expenditures and lower probability on
the event of a negative innovation. Note in this example that the perturbations around the
approximating model take the form of an increased conditional mean for government expen-
ditures innovations "t and an unaltered conditional variance, assuming a zero third moment
according to the approximating model (Et"3
t+1 = 0).
The labor allocation and the tax rate are quantities that are constant in the economy
of Lucas and Stokey (1983). With small doubts about the model though, the history-
dependence of the Ramsey plan takes a particularly sharp form:
Result 3. For small household fears of model misspeci¯cation, we ¯nd that:
1. The labor allocation, tax rate, and tax revenues Tt ´ ¿tht follow random walks with
respect to ¼:
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The household's fear of misspeci¯cation puts non-stationarity into the Ramsey plan.27
27The random walk result holds as long as the upper and lower bounds for labor (and correspondingly for
the tax rate) are not violated, i.e. the non-stationarity is local.
28Note the amount of history dependence in this example: even in the case of i.i.d. government
expenditures (°0 = 1,°i = 0;i ¸ 1 ), the tax rate remains a random walk, a result reminiscent
of the Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002) results in incomplete markets setups. Here
though, the source of the random walk property is the e®ort of the planner to smooth
continuation utilities and his disagreement with the agent and not the lack of insurance
markets.
More speci¯cally, the price manipulation and the heterogeneity forces are entering into
the determination of the Ramsey plan though the di®erence in the two martingale derivatives









t¡1(0) + (1 ¡ ©(0))°(¯)"t: (41)
The increment to the random walk is directly associated with the price manipulation e®ect
©(0)°(¯)"t and the heterogeneity e®ect °(¯)"t. The size of ©(0) depicts the relative strength
of the price manipulation e®ect. Consider for example the tax rate in result 3. A positive
innovation in the present value of government expenditures leads on the one hand to a higher
»t and on the other hand to a positive innovation in the likelihood ratio M¤
t . The increase in
»t expresses the planner's incentive to increase continuation utility in order to decrease the
equilibrium price which leads to a reduction in the tax rate, whereas the fact that the planner
doesn't consider this event so probable leads to an increase in the tax rate.28 Notice that
the two forces operate in opposite directions. This is not a coincidence { high government
expenditures reduce continuation utilities (which increases M¤
t ) and reduce government debt
issued ex ante for these contingencies (which increases »t), due to the planner's desire to use
the possibilities that complete markets o®er and insure against high government expenditure
shocks. If ©(0) > 1, i.e. if there is a high marginal cost of distortionary taxation in the Lucas
and Stokey (1983) economy, { a fact which makes equilibrium prices relatively important{
the price manipulation e®ect dominates the heterogeneity e®ect, whereas when ©(0) < 1,
the opposite happens. The size of ©(0) depends on the present value of government expen-
ditures and on initial debt b0. The two e®ects exactly cancel for the borderline case ©(0) = 1
, which would correspond to a labor allocation in the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy of
h = 2=3.
28The optimal tax rate formula (29) for small fear of misspeci¯cation and quasi-linear preferences takes
the form ¿t(¾) = ¿ +
©(0)
(1+2©(0))2[(M¤
t (¾) ¡ 1) ¡ »t(¾)] + ¾
©
0(0)
(1+2©(0))2, which makes clearer how (M¤
t ;»t) enter
the solution. Taking ¯rst di®erences delivers the random walk result in Result 3.
29Similar comments are due for the optimal debt policy implied by the above allocation.
Assume for convenience that the approximating model is i.i.d. Then with full con¯dence in





an expression that indicates that the government uses state-contingent debt to smooth the
distortions across histories by hedging ¯scal shocks{insuring against high shocks with low
indebtedness towards the private sector and against low shocks with high indebtedness. Note
also how the optimal state-contingent debt inherits the i.i.d. nature of ¯scal shocks. With












which shows that fear of misspeci¯cation adds a unit-root component to the initially i.i.d.
optimal debt. When the heterogeneity e®ect is larger than the price manipulation e®ect
(©(0) < 1), positive past innovations in government expenditures ("i;i · t ¡ 1) lead to
an increase in debt.29 This is because past positive innovations lead to a high current tax
rate, which by the logic of the budget constraint leads to higher amount of government debt
that can be sustained at the optimum. The opposite conclusions hold for ©(0) > 1. As
expected, in the case of ©(0) = 1 the two opposite e®ects cancel, implying - for small fear
of misspeci¯cation - the same optimal debt as in the Lucas and Stokey economy.
It is useful to calculate the derivative ©0(0) in the quasi-linear case
©



















where the second line follows from our particular moving average representation (39). Ex-
pression (42) measures the change in the multiplier if we impute fear of misspeci¯cation to
the representative household. If we assume that
Pt¡1
i=0 °i > 0 (°i > 0 would be su±cient for
29The contemporaneous e®ect of an innovation "t on bt is more likely to have a negative e®ect on debt for
small ¾ due to the insurance motive of the government.













*,θ  = 100











t, θ = 100
Figure 1: Impulse response functions of the unconditional likelihood ratio M¤
t (left panel)
and of the multiplier »t (right panel) to a positive ¯scal shock at t = 1 for µ = 100.
this to hold) then we have the result that ©0(0) < 0. Thus, the household's fear of misspeci-
¯cation increases the cost of distortionary taxation 30 (remember that ¾ < 0). For example,





6.2 Aiyagari et al. (2002) utility function
We can utilize our expansion and analyze the e®ects of small doubts about the model also
for utility functions where the marginal utility channel is present. Consider for example the







The parameter ¡1=Ã controls the elasticity of leisure with respect to the after-tax wage. We
follow for our illustrative purposes the calibration of Aiyagari et al. and set (¯;°;Ã;al) =
30The sign of the derivative ©0(0) depends in principle on the speci¯cs of the problem and is not necessarily
negative.
31(0:95;0:5;2;1). Furthermore, we scale up the amount of leisure available to the household
to ¹ l = 100 and set the initial debt equal to zero b0 = 0.
Shock process of Aiyagari et al. We use as an approximating model for government
expenditures the same process as Aiyagari et al. (2002), namely, an i.i.d. N(30;2:52) and we
analyze the impulse responses of various variables of interest to a ¯scal shock at t = 1 of a
size of roughly one standard deviation above mean. 31
A positive ¯scal shock at t = 1 leads in ¯gure 1 to an increase in the two state variables
(M¤
t ;»t), due to a negative innovation in utility and bonds. The increase is permanent,
since the two variables are martingales. As a result, the ¯scal shock will have in part also
a permanent e®ect on the rest of the variables of interest. Consider ¯gure 2, which shows
the impulse response functions for the Lucas and Stokey economy and for the case when the
household doubts the model with µ = 100, a penalty parameter that leads to a worst-case
distribution that does not essentially di®er from the approximating distribution, as ¯gure 3
attests. Note that in the Lucas and Stokey case all variables return to zero after the shock
at t = 1 due to the history-independence of the solution, whereas with doubts about the
model, they do not. This is not discernible for consumption and barely discernible for labor.
However, the e®ects of fear of misspeci¯cation are clearer for the tax rate and government
debt, which stay permanently above zero after t = 1. Remember that the (M¤
t ;»t) a®ect the
various variables in opposite directions. It turns out that the heterogeneity e®ect dominates
the price manipulation e®ect in our example, which leads to a higher tax rate and higher
debt (or less assets) at t = 1 in comparison to the Lucas and Stokey (1983) case.
War-peace example. Assume now that the approximating model for government ex-
penditures is i.i.d. and that g can take two values (gL = 20;gH = 40) with probabilities
(¼L;¼H) = (0:9;0:1). Let the household doubt the model with µ = 100, which leads to
a worst-case scenario in ¯gure 4 that is practically the same as the approximating model.
However, the optimal tax rate and debt di®er considerably with fear of misspeci¯cation.
Figure 5 depicts the time path of the tax rate and state-contingent debt for a sequence of
¯ve high shocks (war) followed by ¯ve low shocks (peace) with and without full con¯dence
in the model. The Lucas and Stokey plan prescribes a high tax rate for times of war and a
low for peace. At times of war the government runs a de¯cit which is ¯nanced by issuing
31The distribution is approximated with gaussian quadrature with 11 nodes and the initial realization is
set to be equal to the mean of government expenditures g0 = ¹ g = 30. We consider the level of each variable
at history gt = (¹ g; ¹ g;:::; ¹ g) and at history ^ gt = (¹ g;g0; ¹ g;:::; ¹ g), and plot the change among the two paths. We
use a ¯scal shock of size g0 = 32:32, which corresponds to the 7th node in our approximation scheme.
















































Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a positive ¯scal shock for the case of full con¯dence
in the model and for the case of fear of misspeci¯cation with µ = 100.
government debt. At peace the government runs a surplus which is used to pay back the
government debt. With doubts about the model, the tax rate is not staying constant at a
high or low level, but is instead increasing for the ¯rst ¯ve periods and decreasing afterwards,
with a respective increasing and decreasing debt. Note that in this example the heterogene-
ity e®ect again dominates the price manipulation e®ect.
As our two examples indicate, the basic insights we obtained about the Ramsey plan
in the quasi-linear case, are valid also in the more general case when the marginal utility
channel of the period utility index is present.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper answers the question of how to design optimal policy in an environment where
agents have doubts about the probability model governing exogenous shocks. Those gener-
ate endogenous subjective beliefs that are re°ected in equilibrium prices and motivate the

















Figure 3: Shock distribution of Aiyagari et al. (2002) (µ = 1) and household's worst-case



















Figure 4: Approximating and worst-case model ( µ = 100) of government expenditures:
(¼L;¼H) = (0:9;0:1) and (~ ¼L; ~ ¼H) = (0:8978;0:1022).





























Figure 5: Time path of tax rate and debt with and without con¯dence in the model for a
sequence of ¯ve high shocks (gH = 40) followed by ¯ve low shocks (gL = 20).
planner to manipulate them in a way that puts history dependence into the Ramsey plan.
The history independence of the Lucas and Stokey (1983) Ramsey plan is a statement
that optimal policy treats the nodes of the event tree as atemporal objects. This is allowed
because there is a full set of securities at each node and because of the absence of any other
link between the nodes due to the time-additive expected utility assumption. However, with
doubts about the model, the nodes are interconnected through continuation values, which
show up in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution and therefore in equilibrium prices,
an object that the planner cares about.
The intertemporal links introduced by continuation values would play a non-trivial role
also in settings with capital accumulation as in the complete-markets economy of Chari et al.
(1994) and Zhu (1992). For example, Chari et al. show that for a special class of utility
functions (power utility of consumption and separability between consumption and labor)
the Ramsey plan without fear of misspeci¯cation prescribes a zero tax on capital income
after period zero. That will not be true with concerns about misspeci¯cation. We leave the
analysis of this topic for future research.
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